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Interfaith Dialogue and Comparative Theology: 





Interfaith dialogue is based on the premise that there is more that unites than divides us.  
Epistemological humility, acceptance of religious plurality or the need for unity itself have all 
been presented as unifying pathways across disparate religious traditions.  Despite such 
approaches, conceptual understandings of interfaith dialogue have not kept pace with practice. 
This theoretical paper argues that interfaith dialogical theory profits from a deep 
understanding of moral psychology and social learning theory.  The former posits that a sense 
of ‘fairness’ and ‘universal care’ are aligned with religious acceptance.  On the other hand, 
values of sanctity, loyalty and authority promote a sense of religious conservatism thereby 
hindering liberal ideals around plurality and acceptance. The latter suggests that it is first and 
foremost the exploration of difference, not similarity, which provides the tension to question 
our preconceived moral values and constructions and thereby move to more inclusive ones. 
Through contextualising these theories within the reflective spaces at the borders of interfaith 
dialogue, this paper suggests that bridging difference does not lie in making religious 
comparisons but rather in accepting religious ambiguity in pursuit of truth. The burgeoning 
area of comparative theology offers both theoretical and practical guidance for embracing 
religious diversity in a multi-religious world.  
 
Introduction 
The contemporary world is religiously diverse. Different cultures and religions intermingle. 
This raises important social as well as theological questions. Does only one religious tradition 
contain insight into truth or do all? Can we learn from other traditions or should we hold our 
own religious tradition is complete in our relationship with the divine? This paper explores 
these questions within the broader context of interfaith dialogue and the need to add conceptual 
clarity around its understanding and practice.  
 
A guiding principle of interfaith dialogue, as Leonard Swidler, Professor of Catholic Thought 
and Interreligious Dialogue at Temple University claims, is ‘for each participant to learn from 
the other so that s/he can change and grow’ (2013). Defined more broadly in terms of the 
purposeful interaction between members of different religious groups to promote mutual 
understanding, interfaith dialogue has garnered high profile support. Programs delivered by 
secular organisations as diverse as the World Bank, the Anna Lindh Foundation and UNESCO 
has ensured that interfaith dialogue has entered the language of contemporary society in the 
form of international partnerships, cross-cultural exchanges and sustainable social 
development.  It is a key aspect of the U.N. International Decade for the Rapprochement of 
Cultures (2013-2022), an important focus of the educational work of the Anna Lindh 
Foundation (Volpi 2008) and a part of the World Bank’s policy of fighting poverty (Marshall 
& Saanen 2007).   Alongside the establishment on the world stage of centres working 
internationally for the advancement of interfaith dialogue, there is also a proposal for an 
interfaith council at the UN. In the context of a world in which religious- based difference is 
seen as a threat, interfaith dialogue is viewed as a potential harmonising and accommodating 
framework to support unity within the diversity of humankind. 
 
1 Michael Atkinson is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and Philosophy at 
LaTrobe University, Melbourne, Australia. 
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Interfaith dialogue may be a practice whose time has come but it is also one which faces many 
challenges. Beyond a reconciliatory focus, there are multiple areas of uncertainty surrounding 
its implementation. At present the field is characterised by diversity in understandings of 
dialogue (Fletcher 2013), disciplinary basis (Neufeldt 2011) and theoretical orientation. Such 
divergences have contributed to an identified need to develop a robust theoretical basis for 
interfaith dialogue. As Marianne Moyaert argues ‘we are at the level of practice, of encounter 
and action, and not at the level of theory’ (2013 p 204).    
 
This does not mean that the field of interfaith dialogue is lacking in conceptual thought. The 
broad area of dialogue has a deep theoretical basis. Likewise, the discipline of comparative 
theology has both a strong dialogical and theoretical orientation.   Interestingly both these areas 
foreground the problem of bias and the learning required to bridge such bias.  Despite this 
however there has been a significant scholarly absence to exploring the connection between 
interfaith dialogue, social learning and religious based bias.  
 
This paper addresses this void.  It looks initially at the work of diverse dialogue scholars as 
well as the burgeoning discipline of comparative theology.  It then explores both the notion of 
implicit bias and social learning within the interfaith space to suggest a theoretical framework 
for interfaith dialogue.   The central message, utilising a principle of comparative theology, is 
that the dialogue path is not simply about peace and harmony but also an inner journey in how 
we view difference. The paper ends by exploring interfaith dialogical approaches to answer the 
two questions stated above. 
 
Dialogue 
Direct meanings of dialogue can differ depending upon one’s perspective. Most approaches to 
dialogue however hold close to a social constructivist understanding of reality. From a social 
constructivist position, truth is emergent and made in interaction, rather than given, eschewing 
singular perspectives which are partial and limited (Kim & Kim 2008). In this regard, dialogue 
represents the quintessential form of constructivist communication, deriving meaning through 
engaging with difference for the purpose of sharing and constructing new cultural meanings 
(Escobar 2009).  It moves beyond expressions of religious diversity and mutual understanding 
to the creation of something new, together (Platform for Intercultural Europe & Culture Action 
Europe 2010).  In requiring us to challenge, question and to reflect upon our own meanings 
and to ethically question the meanings of others, it demands a spirit of inquiry rather than 
advocacy in the knowledge that no singular religious group has a monopoly on truth. As a 
consequence, new knowledge is at once purposely constructed and idiosyncratic in what may 
broadly be defined as a continual learning process. A central aim, thereby, is not simply 
communication but also the creation of an ethical, humanitarian space where dissention and 
difference may be expressed to thereby stimulate collective, creative expressions through 
reciprocal inquiry.  
 
Notions of dialogue, in the form of discussion between master and student, may be identified 
in the early Hindu classical literature of India and in the Ch’an Buddhist literature of China 
(Besley and Peters 2011). It is the Greek philosopher Socrates, however, known chiefly through 
the writings of his student Plato, who has been the key influential historical figure on dialogue 
in modern western civilisation. His works, which focussed on rational debate and an ethical 
engagement with the other, served as an inspirational source for academic debate as the nature 
of conversational exchanges became once more a focus of academic attention from the early 
20th century onwards (Rule 2004).   
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The existential philosopher Martin Buber (1965), together with the hermeneutic philosophy of 
Hans Georg Gadamer (1989), the reciprocity of Bakhtin (1984) and to a lesser extent the 
rational re-constructionism of Jürgen Habermas (1984) have become synonymous with the 
concept of dialogue through their studies on what may be termed ‘ethical communication’.  
Others may be added to this list.  Paulo Freire, who has been hugely influential in the area of 
pedagogy and human development through his critical orientation to dialogue and David 
Bohm, who sees in dialogue a vehicle to human consciousness, are two such figures. Aligned 
with social constructivism, each of these scholars foreground dialogue as a phenomenon of co-
creation and tension (Stewart & Zediker 2000).   
 
These scholars have also been instrumental in the emerging area of interfaith theory. Keaton 
and Soukup (2009) have proposed a pluralistic conceptualization of interfaith dialogue based 
on Bakhtin’s work, highlighting the reciprocity and mutuality between stakeholders while 
paying attention to ontology and the social context.   Abu Nimer (1999) has applied conflict 
resolution theory to interreligious settings drawing on the work of peace activist John Paul 
Lederach (1995) who in turn drew on Paulo Freire’s critical approach to dialogue. Marianne 
Moyaert (2013) offers a hermeneutical theory for interreligious dialogue deriving inspiration 
through the work of Paul Ricoeur.  Paul Ricoeur, in turn, is frequently compared to Gadamer’s 
own hermeneutic interreligious positioning. 
 
An important point is that each dialogue scholar views dialogue through a different prism 
(Besley and Peters 2011) and is seen to be applicable to different areas of the human 
experience. Habermas, as an example, is particularly suitable for exploring rational deliberation 
within the dialogical space. Buber on the other hand, holds to a more reflective focus, while 
Freire has an andragogical orientation.  This does not mean that understandings of dialogue 
need be constructed around the ideas of a single scholar. Nor does it mean that a given 
orientation to dialogue is suitable only for certain social contexts. It does indicate however that 
the lens through which we look can only ever be incomplete; an interpretation of reality rather 
than reality itself.   
 
As such there is a need to be transparent with regards to the orientation we take to dialogue.  
Given the orientation of this paper in promoting the centrality of learning to interfaith dialogue, 
I find the work of Freire and to a lesser extent Buber and Bohm to be particularly useful.  As I 
discuss in greater detail below, these three dialogue scholars engage deeply in the social 
learning processes so evident in interfaith dialogue itself. 
 
Social learning and dialogue 
Freire (1970) shares the viewpoint that every dialogical encounter exists within a complex of 
social reality as participants themselves choose to see it. Social learning theory suggests that 
participation in a learning environment evolves from our aspirations to be part of, develop and 
negotiate our own sense of identity.  In this regard the creation of knowledge is always a 
socially and morally situated practice.  For Freire, non-coercive, open-ended and reciprocal 
dialogue activates the creative mind and thereby frees it, enabling those who feel silenced to 
vocalise their needs and aspirations. Freire utilises the term ‘oppressed’ for people whose 
voices are limited for diverse reasons and through diverse means.  In doing so he brings into 
the dialogue space the concept of power and voice both external and internal to the individual.  
Although Freire’s focus is on social class, I would argue that his ideas could be transferred to 
any social based construction of difference inclusive of the interfaith encounter. 
Of particular note is that Freire positions dialogue as a struggle which  is both external, between 
individuals and internal, within individuals; a struggle of engagement with what makes us 
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distinctly human while under the realization ‘that we can only ever become more fully human’ 
(Roberts 2005 p.136). Critical reflection and the recognition of the human within the other is 
an essential aspect of this process. In other words, dialogue, along the lines of Freire’s 
understanding, is a never-ending action as people grapple with difficult, complex processes 
arriving at unfinished places in a journey of both discovery and of humanizing change.  
 
Buber (1970) extends the reflective lens beyond actual vocal conversation to include the silent 
spaces within, either in communion with another, or in communion with oneself. As Buber 
notes: 
A dialogical relation will show itself ... in genuine conversation, but it is not 
composed of this. Not only is the shared silence of two such persons a 
dialogue, but also their dialogical life continues, even when they are 
separated in space, as the continual potential presence of the one to the other, 
as an unexpressed intercourse (1970 p. 125). 
 
Buber (1970), in contrast to Freire, sees the dialogic relationship in terms of a concrete and 
life-enhancing possibility born by understanding one another in a spirit of authenticity through 
everyday life (Stewart and Zediker, 2009). Such a perspective brings into question where 
dialogue begins and ends as well as the nature of such dialogue and the importance of silence. 
Buber would argue that dialogue continues beyond conversation into the silent reflections of 
oneself.  
 
Bohm (1996), by further contrast, charges that each person has a set of absolute meanings that 
they cannot readily move away from.  From a Bohmian point of view, an important function 
of dialogue is to reveal these meanings so that they may be explored and the assumptions 
uncovered. Through learning how to dissociate themselves from their reified thoughts, 
according to Bohm, people can thereby develop a different relationship with both their 
reasoning and emotional processes and how they come to know those processes. As a 
consequence, Bohmian dialogue is concerned with meaning and assumption alongside the 
generation and the questioning of abstract generalisations about one’s own identity and the 
identities of others.  
 
Collectively Friere, Buber and Bohm present a learning-based understanding of dialogue 
inclusive of the socio-cultural context (Freire), deep personal reflection and mutuality (Buber) 
and the acknowledgement of meaning (Bohm).  Each presents a pathway to positive change 
emphasizing the importance of critical understanding (Freire), communion (Buber) and 
suspension of thought (Bohm).  As they warn us however, the journey to change is never easy 
for it requires us to come face to face with our own fears (Freire), assumptions (Bohm) and 
incomplete sense of humanity (Buber). In short, it demands that we understand the bias within. 
 
Implicit bias 
At the heart of interfaith dialogue lies a core paradox. Religions promote a singular construction 
of truth, based on a doctrinal view to reality.  This serves to both include others within the 
embrace of all humankind, while excluding others on the basis that they have a misplaced  
perception of truth.  The result is a selective, circumscribed religious narrative.  The narrative 
we live by is fundamentally an exclusive one.  We cannot, at the same time be a pagan and a 
Christian; a Buddhist and a Muslim; a Protestant and a Catholic. 
The power of tradition and our social context to inform and dictate the limits of our viewpoints 
is a recurring point made by dialogue scholars. Our cultural ‘horizon’, according to Gadamer 
(1989, p.304-306), is one frequently mired in ignorance and prejudice about both ourselves and 
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the other ensuring that we cannot readily move beyond that which we have already conceived 
of as ‘truth’. Consequently, many of our assumptions are so closely tied to our sense of identity 
that we cannot resist defending them (Bohm 1996, p.10).   Rather we choose an oppressive, 
inauthentic and monologic form of communication (Buber 1965) that, ‘at its extreme, denies 
the existence outside itself of another consciousness with equal rights and equal 
responsibilities’ (Bakhtin 1984, p.292). At issue is that we, as human beings, are hard wired 
according to our moral philosophy. Our religious bias is so ingrained, deep set and tied to our 
sense of identity that we act through our deep-seated emotions rather than rational thought.   
 
As social psychologist Jonathan Haidt (2016), argues, our moral philosophy exists on a 
spectrum. People who strongly identify with a singular narrative believe that their religion is 
clearly defined, clearly bordered and ordained. They feel a bond with their faith and believe 
that this bond imposes moral obligations. Morals around loyalty, authority and sanctity are 
binding and important (Haidt, 2016 ). At the other end are the more cosmopolitan minded.  
Such people are comfortable with both religious diversity and religious ambiguity.  They are 
inclined to identify with universal values where fairness and protection from harm are of higher 
value than authority, loyalty and sanctity.   
 
While people at the extremes of this spectrum show dramatic differences from each other, many 
of us sit in the middle. The result is different discourses applied to the other. An orientation 
based on exclusion acts to legitimise a singular faith (thereby denying legitimacy to other 
faiths), by claiming a sense of moral authority on truth.  A second, related discourse is that of 
deficit.  It works on the assumption that ‘the other faith’ is inadequate, deficient or incomplete, 
lacking in fundamental understanding that puts it in deficit to one’s own faith.  A third category 
acknowledges the legitimacy and value of the other faith, but only in a limited extent thereby 
negating the need for reflection or questioning of one’s own beliefs. The fourth aspect draws 
on notions of universal humanity, compassion and respect to bridge the sense of constructed 
difference between one’s own faith and that of the other. In so doing it also widens debate on 
questions of truth, identity and power.  
 
Dialogue demands that we value the other, not because it confirms our sense of identity, but 
rather challenges us to question who we are.  In other words, it shifts us towards humanitarian 
viewpoints. Discarding the notion of an exclusive singular truth, embedded in a complex nexus 
of values and priorities is deeply challenging, however.  It is this space of challenge in the 
plural religious landscape that comparative theology offers a unique way of interacting with 
the challenge of otherness. 
 
Comparative theology  
Comparative theology aims to deepen our understanding of religious truth through encounter 
with religious difference. Professor Francis Clooney, at Harvard Divinity School in Cambridge, 
Massachusetts positions comparative theology as ‘a journey in faith’. 
 
If it is theology, deep learning across religious borders, it will always be a 
journey in faith. It will be from, for, and about God, whose grace keeps 
making room for all of us as we find our way faithfully in a world of religious 
diversity (2011 p 165).  
While rooted in one’s own faith, comparative theology views religious diversity as a pathway 
and mechanism for knowing God better.  Arvind Sharma, Birks Professor of Comparative 
Religion at McGill University, presents his approach to religious difference from a similar 
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ethos.  Sharma’s concept of reciprocal illumination embodies the idea that something in another 
religious tradition may enrich our understanding of our own religious tradition.  As he notes 
what if one compares things not in order to judge one item in terms of 
another, but to see how our understanding of the items themselves is 
enhanced in the process… (Sharma, 2005, p 246). 
 
Arvind Sharma is circumspect with how much we can learn about the other.  As he notes, our 
understanding is always framed by our own limited experiences.  Only by converting to another 
point of view can we truly understand their world. Sharma indicates however that we do not 
have to enter the world of the other.  Rather, the point is to be challenged by the other. In 
seeking difference, we can extend our understanding of ourselves and thereby realise ‘that 
apparently different phenomena may also unexpectedly shed similar light’ (Sharma, p 254).   
Sharma and Clooney have added an important element to understandings of interfaith dialogue 
demanding that we see beyond our own preconceived perceptions in order to understand our 
moral bias. The focus on difference, on learning and on change enables us to view the religious 
other not as a challenge to our deep-set feelings about our self but as a resource to enable us to 
explore the mysteries within.  It is this space of difference, learning and change that are 
essential elements for a theoretical framework of interfaith dialogue from a learning-based  
perspective.    
 
An interfaith framework 
I have constructed an interfaith framework according to three principles a) recognition of 
difference, b) learning across difference and c) transformation. In order to explain this 
framework, I layout each facet and contextualise it with examples from comparative theology 
in the context of the two questions in the opening paragraph of the introduction; repeated here. 
Does only one religious tradition contain insight into truth or do all?  
Can we learn from other traditions or should we hold that our own religious 
tradition is complete in our journey in our relationship with the divine? 
 
a) Recognition of difference 
Interfaith dialogue takes place in a space of moral tension where identities of both the self and 
the other are transitive, imagined, self-ascribed and imposed. 
 
Rabbi Erik H Yoffie (2011) makes the point that 
meaningful dialogue happens when the conversation turns to our religious 
differences. … when we recognize that absent a clear affirmation of who we 
are, how we are different and what we truly believe, all our conversations are 
likely to come to nothing. 
 
A key challenge in Yoffie’s quote is to truly understand the complexity of who we are. It is far 
easier to refer to both ourselves and to others through the labels we construct.  Anita Ray, 
Honorary Fellow in the Centre for Inter-religious Dialogue, Faculty of Theology and 
Philosophy at Australian Catholic University, Melbourne, gives a very good example of such 
imposed labels applied to the positioning of Australian Aboriginal people. 
Indigenous Australian peoples have been contained within categories that 
non-Indigenous people have constructed for them. The power-holders in 
Australia have told them who they are and have scripted their roles, 
attempting to homogenize them (Ray, 2014, p 64) 
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Power, categorization and homogenisation are three elements that Ray points to which place 
the ‘other’ in deficit.   
 
Unfortunately, it is often far easier to relate to the ‘Christian’, the ‘Muslim’ or the ‘pagan’ 
through the labels we apply to these categories than the people themselves.  As Clooney argues 
however (2011 n.p.), ‘we should be increasingly reluctant to confuse the necessary shorthand 
claims we make about religions…with the full, adequate account of those traditions’. The 
recognition of difference goes far beyond the labels and categories we place on others (and on 
ourselves).  Rather it is embedded in the moral pursuit of our experiences and in valuing the 
experiences of others. Recognizing our propensity to categorize and replace experience with 
labels enables us to navigate our assumptions and judgements from a position of vulnerability.   
The following statement, by Paul F. Knitter, Paul Tillich Professor of Theology, World 
Religions and Culture at Union Theological Seminary, New York (2013 p 15) offers insight  
into the difference between experience and the potential emptiness of words that so often we 
use to replace experience. 
 
“God” must be an experience before “God” can be a word. Unless God is an 
experience, whatever words we might use for the Divine will be without 
content, like road signs pointing nowhere, like lightbulbs without electricity. 
Buddha would warn Christians…: if you want to use words for God, make 
sure that these words are preceded by, or at least coming out of, an experience 
that is your own. 
 
As such, before we can begin to understand the Muslim, the Buddhist, the Jew we must 
experience what these labels mean from their perspective, not our own.  So often however we 
see the other with our bias, not our discernment.   
 
Shifting our viewpoint to ‘experience’ rather than the words which describe experience and the 
labels we apply to otherness enables us to extend our sense of religious identity. From this 
perspective Knitter makes a profound point in reference to his ‘practice’ of learning from 
Buddhists.  As Knitter notes (2013, p 155) Buddhists are good at 
 
Unitive experiences in which the self is so transformed that it finds itself 
through losing itself. And that’s where I believe Christians can learn a lot 
from Buddhists.  By watching how Buddhists go about achieving their 
‘goals’, Christians can better ’come home’ to their own. 
 
Knitter emphasizes a dimension of faith structured on seeking truth in preference to identifying 
with defined, constructed and absolute meanings. Coming from a position that questions 
religious sanctity to favour the individual right to learn, Knitter eschews the moral authority 
and loyalty of singular religious doctrine to prioritise universal moral fairness. In other words, 
difference between religions is not in the labels applied to certain groups but in the journey 
towards evocative questions and nuanced answers (Steinkerchner 2011). 
 
 
b) Learning across difference  
An exploration and negotiation of meanings, objects or aspects of the self through participative 
structures that affirm and extend a person’s sense of belonging and identity to a more inclusive 
group through the considered construction of a shared vision, a shared practice or a shared 
goal. 
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The theoretical framework of interfaith dialogue constructed above indicates that it is not just 
recognizing difference that is important but also in bridging difference.  A learning-based  
approach to dialogue, which highlights the creation of meanings in the vicinity of a wider 
discourse on reality, brings into focus not just difference but the bridging of difference.  
Creating a learning space supporting a more inclusive sense of identity, requires us to identify 
beyond that which divides us to points of difference we can learn from. 
 
Believers, regardless of one’s religion, are seekers of truth. Haidt (2012) indicates that the 
pursuit of truth can bring people together who normally would be opposed to each other.  
Religious truth however, is always mysterious and elusive. As comparative theologian Scott 
Steinkerchner argues, ‘None of us individually, nor all of us collectively, possess a complete 
understanding of our faith. That fullness of truth lies forever in the future’ (2011, p. 149).  
 
The answer to the guiding question of this paper lies is whether we feel comfortable in 
recognizing the value other religious traditions hold for us in our pursuit of the divine. In a 
world which traditionally has favoured a singular religious identity, cultural plurality is 
suggestive that we can no longer treat ‘the other’ as entirely separate from ourselves. What 
becomes interesting is the moral framework that underpins our positions and thereby how we 
approach otherness.  
 
Above I argued that we, as individuals have a choice with regards to our moral outlook on 
reality.  People who identify with a singular narrative, who believe that their religion is clearly 
defined, clearly bordered and ordained are more likely to base their morality on loyalty, 
authority and sanctity. By contrast, the more cosmopolitan minded are inclined to prioritise 
fairness and protection from harm over authority, loyalty and sanctity.  The result is different 
discourses, and biased understandings of otherness.  
 
Comparative theologians challenge such moral frameworks by practicing a form of deep 
learning based on the premise that it is not only possible to learn from difference but to deepen 
one’s relationship with God through difference. Working at the borders of faith enables people 
who practice thus to both learn from the religious other amd to hear God’s truth in a different 
way.  From such a perspective the argument that encounter with other faiths can weaken one’s 
own faith is all part of the journey.  The cultural dissonance through the exposure to challenge 
can create new insights around one’s own faith and one’s own truth. As Knitter would argue,  
an exclusive approach to religious worship based on a singular moral authority denies the 
spiritual learning accessible from the diversity of humankind.   
 
c) Transformation 
The enablement of people to initiate a process of mutual action, critical consciousness, and 
shared humanity for the purpose of positive human change.  
 
The following quote by Clooney extends the discussion above on the value of religious 
encounter.  
Instead of trying to protect the tradition from the possibility of contamination 
that goes together with encounter, comparative theologians intentionally 
move to the borderland of tradition. As go-betweens, they invest in learning 
from the other, accepting that this also entails disturbing experiences of 
alienation, disenchantment, and friction (2011, p. 165).  
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There are two points I wish to highlight in this quote.  One is the focus on invested learning 
and the other is the ‘alienation, disenchantment, and friction’, associated with such learning.   
Transformation in our own lives demand that we learn and take on the challenges around us.  
In this regard interfaith dialogue always presents as a choice.  A choice around leaving the 
theological comfort zone to learn something new. In doing so we will encounter rich learning 
opportunities that extend our understanding.   Likewise, for interfaith dialogue, seeking 
difference, rather than similarity and learning from such difference also presents as an unknown 
journey; but one of rich possibility.   The work of people such as Clooney, Knitter and Sharma 
informs us that a possible pathway to God lies in neither opposing or agreeing with otherness 
but rather creating a space of reflection around the doubt. 
 
Conclusion 
I began this paper with two principle related questions. 
 
Does only one religious tradition contain insight into truth or do all?  
Can we learn from other traditions or should we hold that our own religious 
tradition as complete in our relationship with the divine?  
 
In the context of interfaith dialogue my suggestion, based on the ideals of comparative 
theology, is that we look to explore difference between religions more broadly contextualised 
through the human need to search for meaning within the vicinity of the divine. A principle 
challenge lies in the unconscious ways that we see both ourselves and others within the myriad 
of meanings that constitute our modern lives.  A learning based dialogical approach informed 
through comparative theology suggests that the value of interfaith dialogue lies not in 
protecting our viewpoints but in realising our vulnerability.  Doing so enables us to not only to 
learn but to change and to promote change in others. If we are going to act on the challenges 
of our capitalistic, spiritually complex and politically divergent world, ‘otherness’ presents not 
as challenge but a facilitative factor for defining who we are.   
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